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a debtor’s good faith at several points throughout a bankruptcy case.2 Good faith is defined by 
common law.3 Thus, there are multiple standards for good faith inquires, depending on the 
jurisdiction, case type, and phase of the case.4  
Under Chapter 7, the court can dismiss a case, on its own motion or on the motion of an 
interested party, when the court finds that the debtor “filed the plan in bad faith” or “the totality 
of the circumstances . . . of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse.”5 Under a section 
707 bad faith analysis, courts have weighed up to sixteen different factors in a totality of the 
circumstances approach, including: “[t]he absence of an attempt to pay creditors;” “[t]he debtor's 
failure to make significant lifestyle changes;” “[w]hether the debtor has sufficient resources to 
pay a substantial portion of debts;” and “whether the debtor failed to make lifestyle adjustments 
or continued living an expansive or lavish lifestyle.”6 Many of these factors are common across 
all good faith analyses under the Bankruptcy Code. However, under the majority rule, these 
factors are of little consequence under section 707 without additional “egregious 
circumstances.”7 Egregious circumstances “entail concealed or misrepresented assets and/or 
sources of income, and excessive and continued expenditures, lavish lifestyle, and intention to 
avoid a large single debt based on conduct akin to fraud, misconduct, or gross negligence.”8  
In In re Zick, the Sixth Circuit found egregious circumstances where the debtor scheduled 
almost $150,000 in legal fees and obligations to family members without further explanation, 
transferred assets just prior to filing, and the primary debt was a judgment against the debtor for 
violating a non-compete contract, in addition to the debtor’s lavish lifestyle.9 The court found 
                                               
2 See McDow v. Smith, 295 B.R. 69, 78 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
3 See In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 424–25 (7th Cir. 1984). 
4 See id. 
5 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2012); see In re Snyder, 509 B.R. 945, 951 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2014). 
6 Id. at 951–952. 
7 See McDow v. Smith, at 81. 
8 See In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991). 
9 See id. at 1129. 
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that the combination of the factors was sufficient to dismiss the plan as filed with bad faith. In 
contrast, in McDow v. Smith, the court found that despite the debtor’s continued spending on a 
lavish lifestyle at a rate of $32,000 per month, his high monthly income of $30,000 per month, 
and millions of dollars in tax debt, the plan was not filed in bad faith because these factors were 
insufficient to constitute egregious circumstances.10 The court pointed to a lack of “fraud, 
misconduct, or gross negligence” or other behavior indicating an attempted abuse of the code.11  
Thus, under section 707, a lavish lifestyle alone is insufficient to indicate a lack of good 
faith because of the egregious circumstances requirement. While this standard represents the 
majority rule, it is not uniformly followed.12 In re Griffieth illustrates a variation of the minority 
rule.13 In In re Griffieth, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New 
York did not require egregious circumstances in addition to the usual good faith factors. The 
factors the court weighed included the debtor’s lavish lifestyle, the failure to repay or attempt to 
repay creditors despite the debtor’s ability to do so, and additionally, a discharge principally 
against a single creditor. The court held that these factors were enough to dismiss the case under 
section 707 for not being filed in good faith.14  
II. Good Faith and Lavish Lifestyles under Chapters 11 and 13  
The good faith analysis for confirmation of a plan of reorganization under Chapters 11 
and 13 does not contain the egregious circumstances requirement of a dismissal of a Chapter 7 
case. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan requires that, “[t]he plan has been proposed in good 
faith . . . . ”15 An analysis of good faith under section 1129(a)(3) typically asks whether, under 
the totality of the circumstances, “there is a reasonable likelihood that the plan will achieve a 
                                               
10 See McDow v. Smith at 82, 83. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at nn. 24–26; In re Snyder at 949 - 950. 
13 209 B.R. 823, 829–31 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996). 
14 See id. 
15 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012); see Carolin Corp., 886 F.2d 693, 699–02 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”16 This standard 
encompasses many of the same factors as the Chapter 7 standard previously discussed including: 
attempts to abuse the Bankruptcy Code by using it for improper purposes, ability to pay, lavish 
lifestyles, and underpayment of creditors.17  
The good faith standard under Chapter 13 is essentially the same as Chapter 11. 
Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan requires that, “the action of the debtor in filing the petition 
was in good faith” and that “the plan has been proposed in good faith.”18 This has been 
interpreted to include the same factors and totality of the circumstances test as used in Chapter 
11 cases.19  
One of the primary factors in determining a debtor’s good faith is a debtor’s ability to pay 
as compared to the pro rata distribution to unsecured creditors. For example, in In re Osborne, 
the debtor’s lavish lifestyle combined with the lack of substantial repayment of creditors was 
sufficient to constitute a lack of good faith under Chapter 11. In that case, the debtors’ proposed 
plan retained a Lexus automobile, a vacation home, and a $140,000.00 “rainy day fund.”20 The 
year prior to filing, the husband-debtor earned $314,000.00.21 The debtors had “over $500,000 in 
unsecured debt, [but] . . . only propose[d] to pay $20,000 to the unsecured class.”22 The court 
                                               
16 In re Hamilton-Gaertner, No. 17-00271-5-DMW, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1401, at *11 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 1, 
2019); see In re Osborne, No. 12-00230-8-SWH, 2013 WL 2385136, at *5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. May 30, 2013) 
(reviewing cases). 
17 See, e.g., In re Osborne, 2013 WL 2385136 at, *5; In re Maxim Indus., Inc., 22 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1982); In re Powers, 135 B.R. 980, 991 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (reviewing definitions of good faith and indicia of 
bad faith). Again, the court can raise the good faith issue sua sponte. See In re Egan, 142 B.R. 730, 733 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 1992). 
18 See 11 U.S.C. §  1325(a)(3), (7) (2012). 
19 See In re O’Neill Miranda, 449 B.R. 182, 194, 195 (Bankr. D. P.R. 2011) (good faith factors include the debtor’s 
ability to pay, proposed payment amounts, attempts to mislead the court, and attempts to abuse the “spirit” of the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
20 In re Osborne, 2013 WL 2385136, at *2–3. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at *5. 
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described the proposed distribution as “tossing the unsecured creditors a bit of spare change.”23 
The court held that the plan was not proposed in good faith and refused to confirm the plan.24  
When a debtor continuously attempts to work with creditors and proposes a substantial 
repayment to its creditors in their Chapter 11 plan, good faith may be found despite a lavish 
lifestyle. For example, in In re Hamilton-Gaertner, the court found that the debtor’s proposed 
Chapter 11 plan satisfied the good faith requirement of section 1129(a)(3), despite a lavish 
lifestyle because the debtor offered substantial repayment to creditors.25 In that case, the debtor 
had an income of about $400,000 per year, with annual expenses amounting to nearly 
$200,000.26 Those expenses included: private school tuition for her three children, two vacation 
timeshare mortgages, a mortgage on her primary residence, and liens on multiple vehicles.27 The 
court weighed the debtor’s lavish lifestyle against the debtor’s continual attempts to work with 
creditors, and the debtor’s reorganization plan setting forth substantial repayment of creditors. 
The court also noted that the debt owed to the objecting creditor was business-related, and not 
due to the debtor’s personal or familial expenses.28 The court held that under the totality of the 
circumstances, the debtor’s lavish lifestyle did not constitute a lack of good faith, and ultimately 
confirmed the plan.29 The court specifically distinguished In re Hamilton-Gaertner from In re 
Osborne on the basis of the factor of the debtor’s proposed distribution to creditors.30  
                                               
23 Id. at 10. 
24 Id.; see also In re Harman, 141 B.R 878, 879 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1992) (“[A] debtor's failure to make anything close 
to the best offer of payment to the creditors violates . . . 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).”). 
25 See In re Hamilton-Gaertner, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1401, at *18–19. 
26 Id. at *2, *9. 
27 Id. at *2, *16–19. 
28 Id. at *15–16. 
29 Id. at *6, *7, *28. 
30 See In re Hamilton-Gaertner, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 1401, at *5. 
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Thus, the combination of the factors of the debtor’s lavish lifestyle and failure to, despite 
ability to, propose a significant distribution to creditors is enough to constitute a lack of good 
faith under Chapters 11 and 13.31  
Conclusion 
 Despite their similarities, the good faith requirements of Chapter 7 and Chapters 11 and 
13 can have different results for debtors with extravagant lifestyles. Under Chapter 7, a plan with 
extravagant expenses will not by itself trigger a finding of bad faith, while under Chapters 11 and 
13, extravagant expenses are enough to indicate bad faith if the proposed plan does not 




                                               
31 See In re Weber, 209 B.R. 793, 800 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (“A plan in which the Debtor retains 100 percent of 
the expenditure necessary to support a lavish lifestyle, while proposing to pay a 5 percent dividend to creditors is not 
proposed in good faith.”). 
